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Abstract  
Cloud computing is a way of delivering computing resources that promises numerous benefits, however, 
organisations worry about its extra levels of abstraction. This additional complexity represents a hurdle in the 
assessment of information and communication technologies (ICT) resilience and no consensus exists yet for its 
analysis. Therefore, CC failures and their effects in organisational resilience (OR) need to be understood. Here, 
OR is defined as the ability of organisations to survive and also thrive when exposed to disruptive incidents. 
Aiming to find out what the requirements are for setting up and running an effective ICT operational resilience 
management system in cloud computing environments (CCE), a conceptual model that helps organisations to 
maintain and improve OR when working within CCE is being developed. This paper addresses the research 
design of this investigation focusing on the foundations and challenges of the conceptual model. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Given the rapid adoption of cloud computing environments (CCE) organisations are increasingly relying on 
computing services being consumed through providers with large data centres and not on in-house environments 
as was customary some years ago. Industry analysts have predicted an entire transformation of the computing 
industry based on its potential and accordingly have made billionaire revenue projections (Gartner 2012; IDC 
2013; Ried and Kisker 2011). These predictions also show that before the end of this decade, 80% of 
organisations will be dependent on cloud services and tens of millions of end-users will be consuming cloud 
services (Dekker 2012). In spite of these figures, CCE have also raised various concerns and an increasing 
number of researchers and practitioners are developing new knowledge from technical to business issues (Yang & 
Tate, 2012). In the former, issues regarding portability, interoperability and security have been studied (Buyya et 
al. 2010; Chen et al. 2010). In the latter, researchers have been working specifically on economic impact, costs, 
reasons for adoption and growth trends (Marston et al. 2011). Specifically, CCE outages are gaining attention 
because hosting infrastructure across multiple locations spreads the risk of disruption and it is difficult to estimate 
how many end-users or organisations depend on a cloud provider. To compound this scenario, cloud services can 
be too complex for consumers to manage and progressively consumers are requesting services from cloud brokers 
instead of contacting providers directly, making even harder to estimate the full impact of an outage (Dekker 
2012; Dekker et al. 2013; Winkler and Gilani 2011).  
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According to the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), this concentration of computing 
services into few CCE is a double-edged sword “on the one hand, large cloud providers can deploy state-of-the-
art security and resilience measures and spread the associated costs across the customers. On the other hand, if an 
outage or a security breach occurs the consequences could be big, affecting a lot of data, many organisations and 
a large number of citizens at once” (Dekker 2012). In other words, as computing moves away from onsite data 
centres to cloud services, organisational resilience (OR) processes become much more complex (Arean 2013). 
This specific topic has been identified as one of the main obstacles to and opportunities for the growth of CCE 
(Armbrust et al. 2010; Badger et al. 2012; Catteddu and Hogben 2009; Cloud Security Alliance 2011; Hancock 
and Hutley 2012), showing the need to understand CCE failures and their effects in OR. This need is addressed in 
this research by proposing a conceptual model that represents how the dynamic phenomenon of using CCE as a 
computing service sourcing model impacts the OR domain (Wand and Weber 2002). 
OR emerged in the field of management in the 1990s as an explanation for the ability of organisations to survive 
and also thrive when exposed to external shocks such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and uncertain 
environments. Scholars have applied this concept to areas such as crisis management (Kendra and Wachtendorf 
2003), disasters (Dalziell and McManus 2004; Paton and Johnston 2001; Stephenson 2010; Tierney 2003), high-
reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001; Weick et al. 2008; Woods and Wreathall 2008) and ICT 
(Caralli et al. 2010). In the latter, “mainly to understand how computing systems impact organisational 
performance, how to assess alternative methods and how to establish essential components”(Herrera and 
Janczewski 2013). Practitioners have also contributed to this field through OR/Business continuity (BC) 
frameworks (American National Standards Institute 2009; British Standards Institute 2011; National Fire 
Protection Association 2004; Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand 2010) mainly focusing on how to 
control organisational behaviour and response during times of disruption. OR is defined as the adaptive capacity 
in a complex and changing environment that enables an organisation to resist commotions and return to an 
acceptable level of performance in an acceptable period of time after being affected by an event (Wilson 2010). 
Some of these frameworks and studies specifically focus on ICT readiness for OR. Particularly, the Resilience 
Management Model (RMM) developed by the Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response 
Team explicitly suggest to study the impact of CCE adoption on the ICT resilience processes, showing again the 
relevance of this topic (Caralli et al. 2010).  
This paper is organised into three sections after this introduction. Section two describes how the main stages of 
this research have been defined by describing the research design. The third section begins by presenting the 
model’s foundations and its main challenges are briefly described. Finally, the fourth section briefly discusses the 
current progress and describes further steps. 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
The main purpose of this paper is to present the model’s foundations, the main challenges that it faces and its 
high-level representation. However, as this model is part of a research that aims to find out what the requirements 
are for setting up and running an effective ICT operational resilience management system in CCE, a clearer 
context is needed. This section presents the research design and places the role of the model in it.  
Three main research questions have been identified: (RQ1) How do the main reference architecture 
characteristics of CCE affect the ICT operational resilience requirements? (RQ2) How should the existing 
processes and controls be adjusted? (RQ3) What new processes and controls should be created? These research 
questions are dealing with real-world complexities and in these cases researchers (Adams and Courtney 2004; 
Mingers 2001; Nunamaker et al. 1991), in the field of information systems, have found that in order to achieve 
richer results a pluralist research approach is desirable because it allows to discover different dimensions. Based 
on this, the multi-methodological approach proposed by Mingers (2001) has been adopted. This approach argues 
that “research is not a discrete event but a process that has phases or, rather, different types of activities, which 
will predominate at different times” (Mingers 2001) and it follows four major phases: appreciation, analysis, 
assessment and action. 
The appreciation phase includes methods that allow the involvement of the researchers in the situation through 
any actors and prior literature review. The detailed identification of the phenomenon, and the initial 
conceptualization and design of the study are the main results of this phase. Initially, an exploratory study was 
proposed aiming to identify new categories of resilience-oriented requirements, however, after a preliminary 
assessment by researchers and practitioners in the field a different approach was chosen as there has been little 
research in this area. Thus, following a literature review approach and addressing specifically RQ1, the first study 
focuses in a conceptual understanding of key issues in the study of OR in CCE. As a result, a research framework 
designed to provide a roadmap from the academic perspective has been proposed (Herrera and Janczewski 2014). 
The framework adopts the cloud definition by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) (Mell 
and Grance 2009) and is constructed from a literature review of CCE derived from well-known reference 
25th Australasian Conference on Information Systems Resilient Organisations in the Cloud 
8th -10th Dec 2014, Auckland, New Zealand    
architectures (Behrendt et al. 2011; Cloud Security Alliance 2013; Khasnabish et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2011) and a 
compilation of OR specifications also derived from the most popular OR/BC standards and models (American 
National Standards Institute 2009; British Standards Institute 2011; Caralli et al. 2010; Standards 
Australia/Standards New Zealand 2010). This multi-level framework captures key issues from the macro level of 
cloud’s architectural building blocks to the micro level of organisational resilience capabilities. The macro level 
captures three dimensions: principles, actors and architecture building blocks focusing on the latter. The micro 
level analyses linkages among resilience process areas in order to identify dependencies that should be considered 
when studying a specific process area. This framework specifically contributes to identify the major differences 
in studying ICT operational resilience within CCE versus an in-house environment. It is also expected to guide 
practitioners’ efforts in understanding how the adoption of CCE impact the risk of business disruption of an 
organisation and specifically, the assessment of ICT’s operational resilience.  
Based on the above framework as well as on industry practices and standards, a sub set of processes and activities 
has been identified as a target to analyse how an organisation can handle disruptive incidents that come from the 
use of computing power in a CCE. This analysis constitutes the second phase of this research and specifically 
addresses the other two research questions RQ2 y RQ3. It includes methods to select strategies to propose an 
explanation of the phenomenon in terms of possible mechanisms or structures and how to improve specific 
weaknesses. A specific theoretical lens is used in order to understand this phenomenon: coordination theory that 
is going to be briefly described in the next section of this paper. As a result the main outcome of this research, a 
conceptual model that helps organisations to maintain and improve OR when working within CCE, from an ICT 
operational perspective, will be proposed. The foundations and other elements for its design are discussed in more 
detail in the next section. This study is meant to provide several contributions to both academics and 
practitioners. From the theoretical perspective, it contributes to an understanding of why coordination is a key 
element in order to maintain and improve OR within CCE. From a practitioner’s perspective, this study specifies 
processes and mechanisms that show how the coordination concept can be used for improving an organisation’s 
ICT readiness to ensure OR.  
For the next phase, an assessment of the model is needed and consequently a third study has been proposed. This 
study will test the proposed model through the analysis of real incidents in New Zealand companies working 
within CCE. The main goal of this assessment is to provide a qualitative demonstration through walkthrough and 
tabletop exercises in order to analyse and improve the model. It will also provide empirical evidence of the role of 
coordination in achieving resilient organisations in the cloud.   
Finally, Mingers’ approach (2001) proposes the “action” phase that intends to disseminate the research results. As 
Mingers states these four phases are not seen as discrete stages that are enacted one by one, consequently, efforts 
to achieve this goal have been incorporated in the three studies that are part of this research.  
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Wand and Weber (2002) define a conceptual model as “an abstract description of an organizational setting (of 
which part is the represented domain and part is the usage environment)”. Following this definition, the 
conceptual model, which is being proposed by this research, represents how the dynamic phenomenon of using 
CCE as a computing service sourcing model impacts the OR domain. As this model is the main research 
outcome, this section addresses three essential aspects of its design: foundations, challenges and finally its high-
level representation.  
Model’s Foundations  
As part of the second phase, analysis, and based on an extended literature review four foundations for the model 
have been identified: 
F1 - OR General Perspective: In the literature two general perspectives of resilience are recognised (Dalziell and 
McManus 2004): (1) engineering resilience that aims to maximise “the efficiency of systems and processes to 
return and maintain the system at its desired state” and (2) ecological resilience that aims to design “flexible 
systems and processes that continue to function in the face of disturbances”. From an organisational perspective, 
“increasing the ecological resilience would increase the magnitude of consequences that an organisation could 
withstand before suffering irreparable damage” (Dalziell and McManus 2004) and as this study is aiming to 
propose a conceptual model to continually improve the effectiveness of an organisation’s resilience, an ecological 
resilience approach has been adopted. 
F2 - Types of Activities: As stated before OR is the result of harmonic and convergent efforts to adapt to and 
thrive from disruptive incidents (in this research disruptive incidents that come from the use of computing power 
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in a CCE). Thus, OR includes both developmental and operational activities in order to prevent; to stabilise, to 
continue critical services, to recover and manage consequences; and to improve activities, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Activities vs. Incident Stages adapted from “Relationship of treatments for disruption-related 
risk”(Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand 2010) 
The first type of activities, preventive activities, deals with strategies designed to minimize an asset’s exposure 
to sources of disruption; examples of such activities are processes, procedures, policies and controls. The second 
type, continue and management consequences activities, includes stabilising, continuing critical functions and 
recovering activities. Thus, it focuses on strategies designed to keep assets operating as close to normal as 
possible when facing disruptive incidents, through strategies such as processes, procedures, polices, plans and 
controls and, also, on strategies that are aimed at returning to routine operations and a full recovery as soon as 
possible. Lastly, improvement activities translate into strategies designed to achieve continual improvement by 
correcting and/or adopting new strategies of both previous types. Dependencies and coordination mechanisms 
among these types of activities when working in CCE are the focus of the model. 
F3 - Underlying Theory for Analysing Activities:  One of the main differences between a traditional in-house ICT 
environment and a CCE is the degree of control over the services. In the former, an organisation has control over 
the whole stack while in the latter; all actors collaboratively design, build, deploy, and operate the system. More 
important, all parties share the responsibility in providing the environment with adequate protections, creating 
dependencies. In Malone and Crowston’s (1994) view, actors in organisations face coordination problems arising 
from dependencies. Essentially their framework defines coordination as “managing dependencies” and defines 
coordination theory as “a body of principles about how activities can be coordinated, that is, about how actor can 
work together harmoniously” (Malone and Crowston 1990). Based on coordination theory and specifically in a 
taxonomy of organisational dependencies developed by Crowston (1994) that defines three main types of 
dependencies: synchronisation, resource allocation and goal decomposition; this study focuses on analysing 
dependencies and coordination mechanisms among ICT resilience processes in CCE.  
F4 - Specific ICT Resilience Processes: The RMM has been explicitly adopted by this research given the 
emphasis on ICT readiness for OR. This model manages ICT operational resilience across three disciplines: 
security management, business continuity and ICT operations management. It has 26 process areas that are 
organised into four high-level categories: engineering, enterprise management, operations, and process 
management (see Table 1) (Caralli et al. 2010). It also defines six levels of maturity: incomplete, preferred, 
managed, defined, quantitatively managed, and optimised.  
Based on the research framework (Herrera and Janczewski 2014) specific areas of concern have been identified 
at both levels: macro and micro. At the macro level, the framework clusters the 26 process areas mainly into two 
architecture building blocks (ABBs): (1) the “business management” block that is divided into two sub-blocks: 
the “business support services (BSS)” deals with business-related services that provides monitoring and 
administration of the CCE to keep it operating normally and the “ICT operation & support (ICTOS)” groups a 
set of technical and operational management services in order to keep the systems going even in the event of a 
disaster. Many resilience concerns arise in this ABB, specifically, the need to extend traditional ICT governance 
knowledge to cloud governance (Peiris et al. 2011) involving business partners in order to establish a robust 
communication plan over the life of the relationship (Rimal et al. 2011). It also highlights the importance of 
establishing processes in order to identify and analyse events, detect incidents, and determine an appropriate 
25th Australasian Conference on Information Systems Resilient Organisations in the Cloud 
8th -10th Dec 2014, Auckland, New Zealand    
coordinated response is considered critical in CCE (Cao and Zhan 2011). (2) The “operational risk & 
consumability” block that compiles non-functional aspects across the CCE providing a solid context for 
operations and support collects non-functional aspects that should be viewed from an end-to-end perspective in 
order to provide the core components to safeguard cloud services. The framework highlights that research areas 
focusing on the strengthening of resilience capacities to (1) determine appropriate requirements, control selection 
and oversee continuity of operations (Julisch and Hall 2010) and (2) ensure that the consumer organisation has 
the capability to manage the risk of unmet requirements from providers and brokers (Dutta et al. 2013) should be 
considered.  
Table 1. RMM processes by high-level categories  
Enterprise management Operations 
Communications [COMM] 
Compliance Management [COMP] 
Enterprise Focus [EF] 
Financial Resource Management [FRM] 
Human Resource Management [HRM] 
Organizational Training and Awareness [OTA] 
Risk Management [RISK] 
External Dependency Management [EXD] 
Access Management [AM] 
Identity Management [ID] 
Incident Management and Control [IMC] 
Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution [VAR] 
Environmental Control [EC] 
Knowledge and Information Management [KIM] 
People Management [PM] 
Technology Management [TM] 
Process management Engineering 
Monitoring [MON] 
Organizational Process Definition [OPD] 
Organizational Process Focus [OPF] 
Measurement and Analysis [MA] 
Resilience Requirements Development [RRD] 
Resilience Requirements Management [RRM] 
Asset Definition and Management [ADM] 
Controls Management [CTRL] 
Resilient Technical Solution Engineering [RTSE] 
Service Continuity [SC] 
 
At the micro level, the framework analyses linkages among resilience process areas in order to identify 
dependencies that should be considered when pursuing a specific resilience-related objective. In the context of 
this research and supporting F1 to F3, this objective is closely related to the establishment of processes in order 
to identify and analyse events, detect incidents, and determine an appropriate coordinated response. From this 
perspective, the RMM identifies seven process areas that drive threat and incident management (Caralli et al. 
2010), as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, this last foundation narrow down the scope of this research focusing on 
core activities and mechanisms these seven processes: control management (CTRL), enterprise focus (EF), 
incident management and control (IMC), monitoring (MON), risk management (RISK), service continuity (SC) 
and vulnerability analysis and resolution (VAR). 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship that drive incident management (Caralli et al. 2010)  
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Model’s Challenges and its associated objectives 
Thus far, the domain for the conceptual model has been explicitly identified by stating the four foundations and 
it is time to refocus on how the main characteristics of CC impact ICT operational resilience and therefore what 
are the challenges that the model is facing. Based on prior research (Almorsy et al. 2011; Grobauer and Schreck 
2010; Kaliski Jr and Pauley 2010; Wahlgren and Kowalski 2013) and focusing on the cloud computing’s five 
essential characteristics defined by the NIST (Badger et al. 2012), this study identifies and analyses specific OR-
related challenges for CCE. A brief overview is presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. OR challenges by CC characteristics  
Characteristic Definition Challenge 
On-demand 
self-service 
A consumer can unilaterally 
provision computing capabilities  
No human interaction takes away an 
important control mechanism 
Broad 
network 
access 
Capabilities are available over the 
network and accessed through 
heterogeneous client platforms 
From a relatively static ICT landscape to a 
dynamic collection of end points of varying 
resilience needs and capabilities 
Resource 
pooling 
Computing resources are pooled to 
serve multiple consumers using a 
multi-tenant model 
Resources are not known a priori and 
therefore cannot be assessed in advance 
Logical entities are subject to consumer’s 
requirements and physical resources are 
mainly responsibility of the provider  
Each tenant may assign different impact 
levels (Low, Medium, or High) to incidents 
The dynamic resource allocation plus the 
variability of external requirements mean 
that an assessment is not possible based only 
on a priori model of the ICT environment 
Rapid 
Elasticity 
Capabilities can be rapidly and 
elastically provisioned to scale 
commensurate with demand 
Need to handle increasing workloads among 
different clouds  
The assessment should cover the consumer 
and the specific provider and the provider’s 
brokers, and so on recursively 
Measured 
service 
Resource usage can be monitored, 
and controlled providing transparency 
for both the provider and consumer  
It implies much finer detail given the focus 
on cost and dynamic resource sharing 
 
These challenges have specific implications for each type of OR-Incident-Management activities in the model: 
For the first group, preventive activities, OR standard practices such as risk analysis and business impact should 
be focused on the correctness of the allocation mechanisms and the qualities of the overall pool of resources, 
instead of analysing deployed resources for a given ICT service. For the second group of activities, continue and 
management consequences activities, the model will be focused on mechanisms to generate and process event 
information in order to detect relevant events and activate appropriate OR strategies among actors when needed. 
For the last group of activities, continual improvement, the model will be focused on mechanisms to monitor the 
performance of all the other mechanisms. These implications have been inferred from the problem definition and 
the described foundations and constitute the objectives for the model. 
High-level Conceptual Model 
The high-level graphical representation of the conceptual model is presented in Figure 3. This model plus the 
foundations, challenges and objectives are being preliminarily assessed in order to obtain early feedback and if 
needed, it would be refined before starting with the model itself, as briefly discussed in the final section of this 
paper. This preliminary assessment is considered part of the third stage,  
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Figure 3: Model’s baseline  
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research aims to find out what the requirements are for setting up and running an effective ICT operational 
resilience management system in CCE by studying the dependencies among incident management driven 
processes and their respective coordination mechanisms. This paper has presented the research design and 
specifically has stated the foundations and challenges, baseline to design the conceptual model, main 
contribution of this research. This baseline and the high-level model are being currently assessed by conducting 
semi-structured interviews with a small group of experts around the world. The data gathering stage has been 
completed and the data analysis is half way through. The following steps will be to refine the baseline, as 
required, and to propose the conceptual model accordingly. So far, two other process areas are starting to play an 
important role for the model: communications (COMM) and compliance management (COMP). The first one 
broadly addresses the way in which an organisation develops, deploys and manages internal and external 
communication to support resilience processes and given that in CCE all actors collaboratively design, build, 
deploy, and operate the system more elaborate communication schemes may be necessary. In the second case, 
COMP is focused on ensuring compliance with the relevant internal and external standards, legislation and other 
obligations. These findings among others are being analysed in order to define the final baseline and focus on the 
model itself. Finally, as soon as the model is ready the third study, main part of the assessment stage, will be 
conducted as described in the research design section.  
This research is following a rigorous multi-method approach that so far has shown its benefits by providing a 
more comprehensive context of the research. It is expected to provide valuable contributions to both academics 
and practitioners. From the theoretical perspective, contributes to an understanding of the role of coordination in 
making resilient organisations in the cloud. From a practitioner’s perspective, this study specifies mechanisms 
that can be used for planning and decision-making to prevent, to respond and to learn from ICT disruptive 
incidents. 
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